Abstract-Dictionary attacks are the best known threats on the password-based authentication schemes. Based on Reverse Turing Test (RTT), some usable and scalable authentication schemes are proposed to defeat online dictionary attacks mounted by automated programs. However it is found that these authentication schemes are vulnerable to various online dictionary attacks. In this paper, a practical decision function is presented, based on which RTT authentication schemes are constructed and shown to be secure against all the known online dictionary attacks. After formally modeling of the adversary, the static and dynamic security of the authentication schemes are proved formally.
INTRODUCTION
Passwords are perhaps the most widely-used methods of user authentication. Although there are more secure authentication mechanisms, e.g. hardware token, certification or fingerprint based authentication, passwordbased authentication remains the widely used mechanism due to its low-cost and convenience. Because passwords should be memorized, they are generally chosen from a small domain, which enables an adversary mounting dictionary attack on password-based schemes [1] .
In order to strengthen password-based schemes against dictionary attack, research work is advanced in two directions. In one direction, tools are developed so that the passwords are harder to be guessed successfully while remaining easily memorized. These tools include password generators, proactive password checkers [2] and reactive password checkers. Password generators produce strong passwords, but maybe hard for the users to remember. Proactive checkers reject the weak passwords chosen by the users when they register an account or change passwords. The drawback of proactive check tools is that if the passwords are rejected several times the users may complain or even be frustrated to continue using the services. The reactive checkers run periodically to find weak passwords in a system and then notify the correspondent users to change their passwords. The problems with reactive checkers are that the weak passwords are vulnerable to attack before the checkers find out, and the checkers consume a lot of resources while running.
Another direction in strengthening password-based schemes is to protect the schemes from being broken even if the passwords can be easily guessed. The dictionary attacks are classified into offline dictionary attacks and online dictionary attacks. By eavesdropping communications between the client and the server, the offline attacks try all possible passwords to find the correct one without direct interaction with the server. On the contrary, in online attacks, each guessed password requires the participation of the server to verify if the guess is correct. Offline attacks can be countered by cryptographic mechanisms, i.e. SSL protocol [3] or many other password-based authentication protocols secure against offline dictionary attack [4] . The measures that are commonly used against online attacks in practice are quite simple. One measure is delayed response to a login attempt in order to slow down attacks; the other is account locking after several failed login attempts. However, these two methods not only maybe vulnerable to denial of service attacks, but also cannot prevent global online dictionary attacks [5] . In global attacks, an adversary can try many user accounts simultaneously with one attempt for one account, or several attempts below the accountlocking threshold for one account. It is easy to see that the above two measures can be circumvented by global online dictionary attacks.
Reverse Turing Test (RTT) is a promising tool to defeat online password attacks mounted by automated programs [6] [7] . The Reverse Turing Test is easy for human users to pass, but hard for automated programs. At present, it is widespread for web service providers to ask users to pass RTTs before the user names and passwords are checked. The scheme is secure against global password attacks mounted by automated programs. The main drawbacks of this scheme are usability and scalability. Because for each login attempt, a user has to answer at least one RTT question, which may annoy some of the users; and the server has to generate one RTT question, which consumes a lot of computation power of the server if there are many users login simultaneously.
Some user-friendly and scalable schemes based on RTT are proposed. The schemes proposed by Pinkas and Sander [5] , and Oorschot and Stubblebine [8] are secure against online dictionary attacks and has the following other five properties:
Available: authentication method must be available on different computers and devices.
Robust: legitimate user should always succeed in logging into his account.
User friendly: the login procedure must cause little inconveniences to the users.
Cost-effective: the authentication method should have low costs to implement and operate.
Scalable: efficiency of the authentication method should not deteriorate noticeably along with the growth of the number of the users.
The schemes are promising to resolve online dictionary attacks efficiently and effectively in large-scale web services. However, these schemes are vulnerable to various online dictionary attacks partly because these schemes are only analyzed informally. The vulnerability of the schemes lies in what is called decision function in this paper. The decision function is to decide if the RTT is mandatory for a login attempt.
Our objective in this paper is to present a formal model of online dictionary attacks on authentication schemes and design a decision function based on which the authentication schemes are constructed and proved to be secure. The main contributions are: several possible attack scenarios on the decision function are discovered, and the scheme based on the proposed decision function is proved to be both statically and dynamically secure. These results are not only meaningful for the secure implementation of Pinkas-Sander's scheme or Oorschot-Stubblebine's scheme, but also consequential to any other schemes using RTT as a building block. As the widespread deployment of RTT-based authentication scheme in web services, i.e., eBay , Yahoo!,etc., we believe that the model and the decision function presented in this paper are of practical importance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the RTT based authentication schemes and the decision function. The attacks on the schemes exploiting the vulnerabilities of the decision function are presented in section 3. Section 4 proposed a practical decision function with informal security analysis. The formal security of the Pinkas and Sander's scheme are defined and proved in Section 5, which demonstrates the security and usefulness of the proposed decision function.
II. RELATED WORK
In online dictionary attacks, an adversary verifies whether a password is correct by interacting with the server. There are some measures devised to defeat online dictionary attacks in practice but not suitable for networking service because some shortcomings persist as described in the following in more detail.
1) Account locking. The account is locked after a predefined number of failed login attempts. In this way, an adversary cannot verify a large number of passwords in a short time. This method is acceptable to single computer environment. But in network services, the drawbacks of this method are denial of service and vulnerable to global online dictionary attacks. When the server adopts account locking strategy, an adversary can attempt to login the server with a victim's user name repeatedly until the account is locked, so that the victim is denied service afterwards. Furthermore, an adversary can avoid trigger the account locking mechanism by trying a different account in each login attempt. In this way, the adversary may find the password of some account after a lot of attempts without causing the lock of any account, which is called global online dictionary attacks or multi-account online dictionary attack.
2) Delayed response. When the server receives username and password from a client, the server does not respond immediately but delayed the response of OK or Error for a while. In this way, the adversary cannot try a large number of passwords with regard to an account in a reasonable time limit; nevertheless, the adversary can mount global online dictionary attacks on multiple accounts in parallel.
3) Hash cash. The client is asked to solve a computation problem before getting the login OK or Error response from the server. The computation problem usually is to find the pre-image of a cryptographic hash function. The main drawback of this method is that the clients' computation capacity is varied, and some of them are too slow to solve the problem in acceptable time. Furthermore, the adversary can mount online dictionary attacks in distributed way, just like the method used in DDOS.
4) Reverse Turing Test. The Reverse Turing Test is a method to distinguish human being from computer program. RTT is easy for human users to pass, but hard for automated programs. A typical RTT is a visual image with twisted words, see Figure 1 . Some other RTTs are based on voice recognition. In a typical RTT based web authentication, a client is asked to answer a RTT while typing username and password. Because only human being can pass RTT, all adversaries using program to mount automatically attacks are defeated. Although at present many practical RTTs used in Web service are cracked, more schemes are invented and hard enough for a program to recognize at present, see Figure 2 . In this paper, we do not consider the security weakness of RTTs.
The above scheme is not scalable and user friendly as in every login attempt the server must generate RTT and check the answer, and the user must answer the RTT. The Pinkas-Sander's scheme and Oorschot-Stubblebine's scheme improve scalability and user convenience by generating and asking RTT with a probability. However, these schemes are designed by try and error and not proved formally, and are found to be vulnerable to various online dictionary attacks in this paper. In this section, we briefly describe two RTT based authentication schemes firstly; afterwards the decision function is defined explicitly. The scheme proposed by Pinkas and Sander is described in three parts, including initialization phase, login procedures and implementation considerations in Protocol 1. The scheme proposed by Oorschot and Stubblebine is described in Protocol 2.
Protocol 1 (Pinkas and Sander) Initialization Once the user has successfully logged into an account, the server places in the user's computer a cookie that contains an authenticated record of the username and possibly an expiration data.
Login procedures:
1) The user enters a username and a password. If his computer contains a cookie stored by the login server then the cookie is retrieved by the server.
2) The server checks whether the username is valid and whether the password is correct for this username.
3) If the username/password pair is correct, then (a) If the cookie is correctly authenticated and has not yet expired, and the user identification record in the cookie agrees with the entered username, then the user is granted access to the server.
(b) Otherwise, the server generates and RTT and sends it to the user. The user is granted access to the server only if he answers the RTT correctly.
4) If the username/password pair is incorrect, then (a) The user is asked to answer an RTT with probability p(0<p<=1). when his answer is received he is denied access to the server, regardless of whether it is correct or not.
(b) With probability 1-p, the user is immediately denied access to the server.
Implementation considerations The choice of the feedback in step 4) must be a deterministic function of the username/password pair, and divides the set of all such pairs into exactly two subsets, S0, S1. The feedback that the user receives must be the same for all pairs in the subset S1.
The Protocol of Oorschot and Stubblebine is introduced in Protocol 2 below.
In step 4 of login procedures in Protocol 1 or in step 10 of Protocol 2, a decision function should be used to decide whether the user is required to pass a RTT. Both protocols require that the function be deterministic of the username/password pair, that is, for any specific username/password pair, the user is either always to asked to pass a RTT or never. ) 1) let 0<p<=1 and integers 1 2 ,
Protocol 2 (Oorschot and Stubblebine
user login with username/password 3) if there is a cookie in user device then server retrieves it 4) if username/password is correct then 5) {if the cookie is present and valid then login successfully 6) else if OwnerMode(username) or FailedLogins(username)
send a RTT to user, login successfully if answer correctly 8) else login successfully} 9) else // username/password is incorrect 10)
{ set AskRTT to TRUE with probability p 11)
if AskRTT or FailedLogin(username)
Ask a RTT, wait for answer. say login fails.
13) else say login fails immediately} Definition 1 (Decision function). The decision function for RTT based authentications schemes is used to decide whether the user is required to pass a RTT when the user try to login with username/password. The input of the decision function is username/password pair, the output of the function is 0 or 1. The output 1 means that this login attempt may needs to pass a RTT at first. For any username/password pair, the probability of the function to output 1 is p. (Note: the actual feedback from the server to the user is also dependent on other factors as prescribed in the protocol).
Actually, Pinkas-Sander's scheme can be viewed as a special case of Oorschot-Stubblebine's scheme with b 1 =0, b 2 = ∞ , so that the attacks on Pinkas-Sander's scheme is also effective on Oorschot-Stubblebine's scheme with specific parameters. For simplicity, in the next we describe our attacks or analysis particularly on PinkasSander's scheme except for the cases noted explicitly.
IV. ATTACKS
In this section, we show some attacks on the PinkasSander's scheme by exploiting the vulnerability of the decision function (We do not consider the cookies theft or RTT cracking threats in this paper). Although the adversary can not directly access the decision function, the feedback from the server, which may be one of the followings: a RTT, login successfully or login failed, is based on the decision function.
In the schemes described above, the decision function is required to be a deterministic function of the username/password pair. Its purpose is to avoid the following attack (called as nondeterministic function attack) when the decision function is a nondeterministic random function: the adversary tries the same username/password pair several times t. If the pair is correct, then the adversary is required to pass a RTT in all attempts, otherwise the adversary is required to pass a RTT in all attempts with probability pt, which can be made arbitrarily small if p<1. Thus the adversary can distinguish the correct guess from the incorrect ones.
Though the above attack can be countered by requiring the decision function deterministic, it is not enough for the secure implementation of the schemes. In these schemes the decision function is not concretely defined. As we can see below, the definition of this function is not a straightforward task, and if it not designed carefully, it would be vulnerable to other attacks. Obviously, it is practically impossible for the function to be defined as enumerating all the possible input and output pairs because the domain of the function (i.e. all possible username/password pairs) is so large (Remark: we suppose that the length of the username and password are limited, otherwise the domain is infinite). Intuitively, the function can be built on cryptographic hash functions. According to the random oracle model (ROM) introduced by [9] , the only way to compute a value h(x) is to query the oracle of function h. This can be thought of as looking up the value h(x) in a giant table of random number. For each x, the value h(x) is random, but for queries with the same x, the value h(x) is the same for each query. Therefore hash functions can be treated as deterministic random functions. A simple definition of the deterministic decision function based on hash functions is as follows.
Definition 2. Suppose h is a cryptographic hash function.
The ACC is the set of username/password pairs in a system accounts database. A pair of username and password is "correct" in the system, iff ( , ) username password ∈ ACC . The passwords are chosen randomly from a set of N passwords. Every username is unique in ACC. Let 2
, p is the probability parameter in the authentication scheme.
Definition 3. The function that deciding whether a RTT question is needed is
D username password if h username password a if h username password a
, the user who login with username/password is required to pass a RTT by the decision function in this login attempt. However, the feedback to the user is also dependent on other factors as defined in the authentication schemes.
The function defined above satisfies all the requirements in Pinkas and Sander's scheme or Oorschot and Stubblebine's scheme, i.e., the function is deterministic and with probability of p the user is required to pass RTT if the pair of username and password is incorrect according to D 1 . However, if the function D 1 is public or known by the adversary, then the scheme is vulnerable to dictionary attack (called as known function attack). Without logging into the server, the adversary can determines if 1 ( , ) 0 D username password = for a pair of username/password. Then the adversary logins to the server and tries each pair of username/password with 1 ( , ) 0 D username password = . If the adversary receives a RTT question, it can be sure that the username/password pair is correct.
Even if D 1 is kept secret, there is another attack. Suppose that many users change their passwords after a period of time, which is a common security policy. The adversary may mount attack as follows (called as changed password attack): 1) Game 1. Try every pair of username/password in the dictionary to login the server and record the pairs that are required to pass RTTs into set X.
2) Game 2. After Game 1, some users changed their passwords. Then the adversary tries again every pair of username/password and records the pairs that are required to pass RTTs into set Y.
3) Now the adversary compares the set X with Y. There may be three possibilities: a) a pair of username and password in X is also in Y. b) a pair of username and password in X is not in Y. c) a pair of username and password in Y is not in X.
For the case of b), the adversary knows that the pair username/password is correct at time of the first game, but incorrect at second game; for the case of c) the username/password is incorrect at time of the first game, but correct at the second game.
The probability that at least one pair of username/password is in case of c) would be high if a large number of passwords are changed. To make this attack more practical, the adversary can try several passwords for the same username without answering the RTTs in both games. For each password, the adversary records whether the RTT is required. There is no mechanism in Pinkas and Sander's scheme that prevents the adversary from doing this, whereas in Oorschot and Stubblebine's scheme, the adversary can do this only if the failed logins for the same username do not exceed b 2 . Consequently, it is highly probable for the adversary to find a correct username/password pair.
From the attacks above, it is shown that the requirements in Pinkas and Sander's scheme and Oorschot and Stubblebine's scheme for the decision function are not adequate for the security of the schemes.
V. A SECURE DESIGN
In this section, we will design a secure decision function, based on which an authentication scheme are constructed by improving the Pinkas and Sander's scheme. The decision function is evolved from the simple decision function D 1 defined above. Surprisingly, this secure decision function is not deterministic in the strict sense.
The countermeasure to the known function attacks is simply to use keyed hash function such as
The key k is only unknown to anyone except the server:
The countermeasure to the changed password attacks is a little more complex. One naïve method is to require the passwords chosen by the users must satisfy that ( , , ) h username password k a <= . If p=0.01, then only one percent of the passwords chosen by the user is permitted. It is apparently not user-friendly. An alternative is that two decimal numbers (0-9) chosen by the server are appended to the password chosen by the user to form a permissible password. However, the user should memorize the two random numbers, which is not user-friendly. A more promising method is that when some user's password is changed, or new user account is created, the key k of the keyed hash function ( , , ) h username password k is updated as well. It can be shown that the known function attacks and changed password attacks are prevented, however a variation of the nondeterministic function attacks return back.
The adversary tries every possible username/password pair at one game. Once the key k is changed, the adversary repeats above game. After t games, If the pair of username/password is correct and unchanged, then the adversary is required to pass a RTT in all attempts; if the pair username/password is incorrect in all t games, the adversary is required to pass a RTT in all attempts with probability pt which can be made arbitrarily small; otherwise, the pair must be incorrect in c (0<c<t) games (which means that the password is changed between games), the adversary is required to pass a RTT in all attempts with probability pc. Although the probability for the pairs in the last case may not be made small enough, the number of these pairs would be no more than t, which means it is not difficult for the adversary to test whether each pair in this case is correct manually as t is not large.
To counter all the known attacks, our proposal is to associate one key with one account (user name), and if the password corresponding to a username is changed, the key must be changed also. The definition is as follows: Protocol 3 (Improved scheme of Pinkas and Sander) Initialization: There are a set of user account in the server. Each account has a username and a password. The server randomly chooses a key k, and for every user u a random key k u .
Login procedures: (Remark: the following step 1 to 3 is the same as the original scheme)
4) If the username/password pair is incorrect, then (a) The server checks if 3 ( , ) D username password =1 then the user is asked to answer an RTT. When the answer from the user is received the user is denied access to the server, regardless of whether the answer is correct or not.
(b) The server checks if 3 ( , ) D username password =0, the user is immediately denied access to the server.
Password updating procedures: 1) When a user updates its password, then the old password of the user is authenticated, and the user's password recorded in the server is updated.
2) If the password is changed successfully, then the relevant key k is updated.
Account creating procedure: 1) When a user registers an account, the username u and password p is set by the user.
2) The server randomly chooses a key k u . □ It is apparent that D 3 is not a deterministic function, for example, in case any user changes his password the corresponding k i is changed, as a result the decision function is changed also. However it can be shown that Pinkas-Sander's scheme based on the decision function defined above is secure against all known attacks. Because for every hash function in the definition of function D 3 there is a secret key, the adversary cannot predict the result of the hash function. Therefore the known function attacks are defeated. When a password is changed, the corresponding key is changed also. As the probability of the adversary required to pass a RTT for the same username/password before or after the password is changed is p, the changed password attacks is prevented. If parameter a and ACC are unchanged, the function D 3 is a deterministic function, the nondeterministic function attacks have no effect. When a password for a username is changed, the function D 3 for other accounts remains deterministic, and the all known attacks will not effect. If new accounts are created, or old accounts are deleted, or parameter a is changing, the function D 3 is not a deterministic function any more, however these changes will not cause nondeterministic function attacks.
VI. FORMAL MODELLING
As the analysis above is informal, it cannot guarantee that there are no other attacks. Therefore it is necessary to discuss the security of schemes based on the decision function D 3 with formalism. In this section, we propose a formal model of online dictionary attacks on user authentication. The adversary's ability and security properties are modeled based on which the security of scheme is proved formally in the next section.
The most common setting of authentication in previous authentication modeling is two-party authentication. In this setting, the participants are peer to peer. Another common setting is three-party, in which there is a server acting as a trusted third party. However, in web service authentication, there are many clients and one server, in which the clients are different from the server. In fact, the two-party model is not a suitable for this kind of setting.
Because the server has maintained many user accounts, the security of one user account may affect the security another, which is not considered in two-party or three party setting.
In order to model online dictionary attacks, we list all assumptions of the formal model. Some assumptions are pointed out before, for example, the cookies theft or RTT cracking threats are not considered. Furthermore, there are some other assumptions. All assumptions are list as follows.
Assumption 1: The machines of clients and server are benign. This means that an adversary cannot corrupt the server or another user. Because our target is online dictionary attacks, this assumption can simplify our model. However, this model is modular. When more powerful adversary should be considered, this restriction may be lifted and the model can be expanded.
Assumption 2: The communication channels are secure. In web service, SSL is commonly used to protect channel communication.
Assumption 3: The Reverse Turing Tests are secure. Although some practical RTTs may be cracked in reasonable time, we consider it t be out of the scope of this paper.
Assumption 4: The adversary is an insider. This means that the adversary is a legal user of the server and has the privilege to login the server and access the service provided by the server. Furthermore, the adversary can even be the administrator of the server, which means the adversary can create account, delete account, change the password of another user, etc.
Assumption 5: The server is authenticated. This is a practical assumption in web service because there are methods to insure the server is authentic, for example, a user can check the signature of the mobile codes of the web service.
In the next, the formal model of the adversary and the security properties are defined.
Definition 5. (Static Security) The server has internal state. Suppose that the state of the system is static, the state of the server remains the same throughout the attacks of an adversary. There is only one interface to the adversary in the server. The adversary can only try to login the server, which is modeled as a login oracle: Login (U, P). This oracle is also termed as feedback function F. The adversary is modeled as a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm A which has oracle access to the function F and the output of A is a username/password pair (u,p). Oracle access means that the adversary can ask the function F with any username/password pair and get back the result F(username, password). The adversary's goal is to guess the password of any user u. If the p is the password of u, then the adversary wins the game, which is called Succ. The Advantage of adversary A attacking the protocol P is [ ]
The protocol P is said to be (t, ε )-OL-secure if the adversary A's advantage is smaller than ε for any adversary A running with time t.
Definition 6. (Dynamic Security) There are several oracles access to the server. These oracles are used to model the capabilities of the adversary to attack the protocols.
1) Login (U, P): The query models the user to login server.
2) CreateAccout (U): The query models the creating of user account in the server. The query adds an account with user name U and a random password in the server if U does not exist. The output of the query is OK if the account is created successfully, otherwise is error.
3) DeleteAccout(U): The query deletes an account with user name U in the server if U does exist. The output of the query is OK if the account is deleted successfully, otherwise is error. 4) ChangePassword(U,pw): The query models an insider adversary U set the password of itself to pw. The output of the query is always OK and U is considered as an insider adversary.
5) SetPassword(U): The query models an adversary waits the user U to change its password. The output of the query is always OK.
Let the adversary A be a PPT algorithm that has been authorized to all the operations defined above, the output of algorithm A is a username and password pair (u, w), in which u has not been in the input of any "set a password" operation in the algorithm. 
VII. FORMAL PROOF OF SECURITY
In this section, the security of protocol 3 is proved under the formal framework of user authentication against online dictionary attacks proposed in the previous section. Before proof, the state of the server and oracles should be instantiated on protocol 3.
Definition 7. The server state is ACC={(username i , password i )| i=1,2,…,n } and K={k i | i=1,2,…,n }. Suppose that the state of the server is static. There is feedback function F defined as follows: Because the state of the system is static, the function F is a deterministic function, i.e., access to the function with the same input will get the same feedback, and the probability that a username/password pair is correct is independent of the feedbacks of oracle access to the function F with other usernames as input. Therefore there is an algorithm B such that the success rate of algorithm B is the same with algorithm A. In algorithm B, all the inputs of oracle accesses to the function F have the same username as what is in the output of B and there is only one oracle access for each distinct username/password pair, e.g. (u,w 1 ),(u,w 2 ), …, (u,w t ).
Next, we show that the upper bound of the probability for algorithm B to find a correct username and password pair (u, w) is 1/(pN).
If for an oracle query with (u, w) to the function F the feedback is 0, (u,w) is definitely incorrect. Otherwise, the probability that
As the password for a username u in ACC is chosen from N passwords space randomly, and for a random k, the value of h(u,w,k) is random according to Random Oracle Model (Bellare and Rogaway,1993) , therefore:
If the algorithm makes another oracle access with ( , ) u w′ , the probability for algorithm B to find a correct username and password pair will not increase, because:
( 1) ( ( 1) 1)( ( 1) Based on the results above, it is clear that after a sequence of oracle query with (u,w 1 ), (u,w 2 ), …, (u,w t ), the probability that ( , ) i u w ∈ ACC (i=1,2,…,t) is no more than 1/(pN); while the probability that ( , ) u w ∈ ACC
... ( , ) , {0,1}
ACC
In conclusion, for all possible oracle accesses, the upper bound of the probability for algorithm A to find a correct username/assword pair is 1/(pN). □ Definition 8. The system state is ACC={(username i , password i )| i=1,2,…,n } and K={k i | i=1,2,…,n }. The system supports the following operations: 1) Login oracle access to function F as defined in Definition 7: input=(username, password), output=F(username, password). The system state is unchanged;
2) To create an account: input=(username), output={FAILURE/SUCCEES}. If the username of input is not in ACC, then output=SUCCESS else output=FAILURE. If the operation succeeds, the system state becomes
The corresponding password and k are chosen randomly by the server and are unknown to the adversary);
3)
To delete an account: refer to definition of creation of an account.
4)
To change a password: input=(username), no output, the password and key associated with the username are changed to new values chosen randomly by the server if username exists; This operation is used to model the user who changes his password during the attack.
5)
To set a password: input=(username, password), no output, the password associated with username is changed to password, and the key {k} associated with the username are changed to new value chosen randomly by the server if username exists. This operation is used to model the adversary changes the password of him. Theorem 2. (Dynamic Security) The adversary is modeled as algorithm A in Definition 8. The upper bound of the probability that the algorithm A succeeds (outputs a correct username/password pair) is 1 pN Proof: It should be proved that for any sequence of the operations in Definition 8, the adversary couldn't succeed in finding a correct (u,w) with probability more than 1/(pN).
1) At first we prove that the operations on one account u (i.e. u is the username in the oracle input) are "noninterfering" with the operations on other accounts, which means that for any sequence of operations, if the operations on other accounts are removed, the outputs of the remaining operations on the username u are unchanged. The notion of noninterference is borrowed from [10] .
Beginning from the last operation of the operations sequence in the algorithm A backwards, if the operation op is on a username other than u we show that op can be removed without affecting the outputs of the remaining operations (Note that the outputs of operations preceding op are not affected, and operations after op are all operating on u). a) If op is an oracle access, the system state will not change, therefore all operations following op are not affected after op is removed. b) If op is a "create" operation, the system state is {( , )} u w ′ ′ ACC U , { } k′ K U . It can be checked easily that for any operation defined in Definition 8, the outputs will not change when it is operating on the account u after op is removed. c) Similarly, if op is a "delete", "change", or "set" operation, it can be checked that after op is removed, the outputs of remaining operations will not affected. Thus, op can be removed without affecting the outputs of the remaining operations. Thus all operations on accounts other than u can be removed one by one from tail of the sequence to the head without affecting the feedbacks of remaining operations.
2) For two different accounts and the corresponding keys (u 1 ,w 1 ,k 1 ) and (u 2 ,w 2 ,k 2 ), password w 1 and key k 1 of the first account are chosen independently of w 2 and k 2 , so that it is easy to see that the probability that a (u, w) pair is correct is independent of the feedbacks of operations with usernames other than u as input.
Consequently, there is an algorithm B with only operations on the account u, such that the success rate of algorithm B is the same with algorithm A.
3) Now we prove that there is an algorithm C with only operations of "login oracle access to function D 3 " on u, such that the success rate of algorithm C is the same with algorithm B. According to Definition 8, since u is in the output of B, the "set" operation on u should not exist in algorithm B. After the operation of "create" or "change a password" on u the corresponding password and key (w, k) are changed randomly, so that the probability that a (u, w) pair is correct is independent of the feedbacks of operations before the operation of "create" or "change a password" on u. Therefore, there is an algorithm C with only operations after the last operation of "create" or "change a password" on u in B, such that the success rate of algorithm C is the same with algorithm B. The operations in C are "Oracle access to function F" and/or "delete" on u. If an operation "delete" on u exists in C, the probability that a (u, w) pair is correct is 0, otherwise, by Theorem 1 the success rate of algorithm C is no more than 1/(pN). □ Note that if parameter a in the function D 3 can be changed, the scheme is also secure. This can be proved after adding an operation "To change parameter a" in Definition 8.
According to the results from Theorem 1 and 2, the advantage of the adversary will not increase with the number of login queries, so that the protocol 3 is immune to online dictionary attacks.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, several possible attack scenarios on the decision function are discovered, i.e. known function attacks, changed password attacks and a variation of the nondeterministic function attacks. A practical decision function shown to be secure against all known attacks is defined. Based on the usual operations to user accounts, the formal models of the adversary are presented, under which the static and dynamic securities of Pinkas-Sander's scheme based on the proposed decision function are proved. The decision function can also be applied in Oorschot and Stubblebine's scheme to ensure its security.
It should be noted that the proposed decision function is not deterministic as required by the previous schemes. We expect that the results in this paper will directly contribute to the secure implementation of the RTT based authentication schemes.
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